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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Mitchell Lee Walck appeals from the district court’s order summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition following his 2014 convictions and
sentences for second degree kidnapping, aggravated assault on a law
enforcement officer, and robbery.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The district court explained the facts and proceedings of Walck’s
underlying criminal case as follows:
In case no. CRF-2012-21458, petitioner pled guilty to second
degree kidnapping, aggravated assault on a law enforcement
officer, and robbery, in accord with a binding plea agreement
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11. The parties agreed that the
sentences would run concurrently, but were otherwise open to
argument. Petitioner affirmed that no one threatened him or made
any promises outside of the plea agreement to him. He indicated
that he understood the agreement, the charges, his rights, and the
potential penalties. He indicated that he was not under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. The court accepted petitioner’s plea
as a free and voluntary act.
On the kidnapping count, the court imposed a sentence of
20 years fixed and 25 years indeterminate, [1] for a total term not to
exceed 25 years. On the aggravated assault count, the court
imposed a sentence of 10 years fixed and zero years
indeterminate, for a total term not to exceed 10 years. On the
robbery count, the court imposed a sentence of 20 years fixed and
life indeterminate, for a total term not to exceed life. These
sentences were ordered to run concurrent with a sentence that
petitioner was serving in North Dakota.

1

Obviously, the indeterminate portion of Walck’s sentence for kidnapping is five
years, for a total unified sentence of 25 years. See Idaho Board of Correction
website: https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender_search.
1

Defendant appealed and subsequently moved to dismiss his
appeal. The remittitur dismissing defendant’s appeal was filed on
January 20, 2015.
(R., pp.34-35.)
On November 23, 2015, Walck filed a petition for post-conviction relief
with a supporting affidavit. (R., pp.4-12.) In his petition, Walck claimed, inter
alia: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for (a) coercing him into pleading guilty,
and (b) failing to consolidate his case “with other Idaho counties that had pending
charges”; (2) he was illegally convicted and sentenced, under principles of
double jeopardy, for a crime for which he had already been convicted and
sentenced in North Dakota; and (3) related to his “coercion” by trial counsel
claim, he pled guilty to crimes for which he was not guilty. (R., pp.4-12, 39-40.)
Walck filed a motion for default, alleging the state failed to file a timely
Answer to his post-conviction petition.2 (R., pp.29-31, 37.) The state filed an
Answer to Walck’s post-conviction petition (R., pp.23-24), and a motion to
dismiss his motion for default judgment (R., pp.25-26).

The state also filed

“Respondent’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Default Judgment” (R.,
pp.32-33), stating, “an Answer was filed; however, in the event that it was not
received by the Petitioner, Petitioner cannot claim any prejudice.” Walck filed an
objection to the state’s request that the court deny his default judgment. (R.,
pp.49-51.)

2

The Clerk’s Record does not include Walck’s motion for default. However, the
references to such motion by the district court (see R., p.37) and the state (see
R., pp.25-26), as well as “Petitioner’s Motion to Uphold Motion for Default
Judgment” (see R., pp.29-31), verify that Walck filed such a motion.
2

On January 29, 2016, the district court entered a Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, preliminarily ruling:
Petitioner lists multiple actions of his attorney, but he has not
shown that the attorney’s representation failed to meet objective
standards of competence or that any prejudice resulted from his
counsel’s performance. He has not shown that the results would
have been any different had counsel performed differently.
Petitioner claims he was not informed about binding Rule 11
plea agreements, but the record shows that petitioner entered into
one, informing the court that he understood it. Petitioner claims he
is “serving a sentence twice for the same crime,” but the record
shows that he is serving his sentences concurrently for distinct
crimes. Petitioner claims he pled guilty to crimes for which he was
not guilty, but the record shows that he pled guilty because he was
guilty. Petitioner claims that he pled guilty due to duress and
compulsion, but the record shows that he pled guilty freely and
voluntarily, affirming to the court that he had not been threatened.
Summary dismissal upon a motion to dismiss or at the
court’s initiative is permissible where the evidence raises no
genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant’s
favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Gonzales
v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991);
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App.
1988); and Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376
[Ct. App. 1987]. I.C. § 19-4906(b) states:
When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the
application, the answer or motion, and the record, that
the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief
and no purpose would be served by any further
proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention
to dismiss the application and its reasons for so
doing. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to
reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal.
Based upon the pleadings filed by petitioner, there is no
genuine issue of material fact that would entitle him to relief if
resolved in his favor. An evidentiary hearing is not justified
because petitioner has not tendered a factual showing warranting
relief that was based upon admissible evidence. Petitioner has not
shown a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different. He has not presented sufficient admissible evidence or

3

proof of prejudice, but only unsubstantiated claims of wrongdoing.
Petitioner’s filings do not provide any factual basis for relief.
Petitioner does not submit any evidence that would lead to the
conclusion that his guilty plea was marred by non-harmless error.
See Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516, 975 P.2d 1181 (Ct. App. 1999).
Since the application fails to raise material issues of fact that
justify an evidentiary hearing, no purpose would be served by any
further proceedings. Accordingly, the court intends to dismiss
petitioner’s application. Petitioner may reply within 20 days to this
proposed dismissal.
(R., pp.39-41.)
In response to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, Walck filed “Petitioners [sic]
Objection and Reply to Courts [sic] Notice of Intent and Default Judgment.” (R.,
pp.52-64 (including attached exhibits).)

The district court entered an Order

Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and a Judgment. (R., pp.78-81.)
Several days later, Walck filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment” requesting a
telephonic hearing on three motions: (1) his summary judgment motion, (2) his
motion for default motion, and (3) a “post-conviction constitutional violations”
motion (R., pp.87-89), which the court “treated collectively” as a motion for
reconsideration, and denied (R., pp.90-92).
Walck filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.93-97.) Several weeks later,
Walck filed a “Motion to With-Draw [sic] Guilty Plea Declaring Manifest Injustices”
in his post-conviction case, which the district court denied. (R., pp.108-115.)

4

ISSUES
Walck states the issues on appeal as:
(1)

Ineffective assistance of counsel (district court)[.]

(2) Illegal conviction and sentence for crime already convicted of
and serving time for concurrently [sic] with the State of North
Dakota. Serving a sentence (twice) for the same crime in violation
to [sic] double jeopardy statute.
(3) No consolidation of other county of Idaho charges leaving
Appellant subjected to further arrests.[3]
(4) Prosecutor failed to respond to Appellants [sic] post-conviction
relief petition in a timely manner – no proper mailing of Answer and
or Reply.
(5) District court abused its descretion [sic] and violated the
uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act in dismissing valid default
judgment filing and holding an evidentiary hearing.
(6) District court abused its descretion [sic] in denying a valid
with-draw [sic] of guilty plea citing gross manifest of injustice, is
clearly justified by Appellants [sic] proper petitions and motions
available to Idaho Supreme Court Records-Transcripts etc.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Walck failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing
his post-conviction claims? Additionally, has Walck failed to show the district
court abused its discretion in denying his motion for default judgment and erred
in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas?

3

Walck contends his trial counsel ineffectively failed to consolidate charges from
other counties. (Appellant’s Brief, p.8 (“[He] . . . requested a . . . ‘globalization’ of
my numerous charges in other counties, then changed his mind . . . .”).)
5

ARGUMENT
Walck Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His
Post-Conviction Claims; Additionally, He Has Failed To Show The Court Abused
Its Discretion In Denying His Motion For Default Judgment And Erred In Denying
His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Pleas
A.

Introduction
Walck challenges the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition,

and within that proceeding, the denial of his motion for default and the denial of
his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

(See generally Appellant’s Brief.)

Walck’s arguments fail because (1) he failed to provide the district court
and this Court with an adequate record for appellate review of the claims related
to the first three issues presented on appeal, (2) he failed to preserve his claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to change venue,
(3) he failed to show any error in the district court’s summary dismissal order and
order denying his motion for default, and (4) the district court lacked jurisdiction
to consider his motion to withdraw his guilty plea in a post-conviction
proceeding.4
B.

Standards Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material

4

Although the district court’s grounds for its decisions do not always reflect the
precise grounds advanced in this brief, the court’s correct rulings may
nonetheless be upheld on alternative, yet correct, bases. See State v. Morris,
119 Idaho 448, 450, 807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate review,
the lower court’s ruling must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any
theory); State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1997)
(where district court’s ruling is correct it may be upheld on alternative basis).
6

fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).
The grant or denial of an application for the entry of default judgment in a
post-conviction proceeding rests within the discretion of the district court.
Johnson v. State, 112 Idaho 1112, 1114, 739 P.2d 411, 413 (1987) (per curiam).
In determining whether the district court has abused its discretion, this Court asks
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993,
1000 (1991).
Jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review on appeal. State v.
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003).
C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.

A petition for post-conviction relief

initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522,
164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550
(1983).

7

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own
initiative, if the applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the
burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190
(1975).
However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
D.

Walck Has Failed To Provide The District Court And This Court With An
Adequate Record For Appellate Review Of The Summary Dismissal Of
His Post-Conviction Claims, As Challenged In Issues 1, 2, And 3
In his first three issues on appeal, Walck argues: (1) his trial counsel was

ineffective for (a) failing to file a motion for a change of venue (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.5-6), (b) pressuring him to enter his guilty pleas (id., pp.5-7), and (c) failing to
consolidate charges from other counties with his case (id., pp.5, 8); and (2) his
convictions and sentences are illegal under principles of double jeopardy
because he was convicted and sentenced for the same crime in North Dakota

8

(id., pp.5-8).5 Walck’s arguments fail, however, because he failed to provide the
district court (and, consequently, this Court) with the Clerk’s Record and any
transcripts of relevant proceedings from his underlying criminal case; therefore,
he has failed to provide an adequate record for appellate review of his first three
issues.
It is axiomatic that the appellant bears the burden of providing a sufficient
record on appeal to substantiate his or her appellate claims. State v. Beason,
119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106
Idaho 447, 449, 680 P.2d 869, 871 (Ct. App. 1984); see also State v. Murinko,
108 Idaho 872, 873, 702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct. App. 1985). “In the absence of an
adequate record on appeal to support the appellant’s claims, [the appellate court]
will not presume error.” State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 38, 43 P.3d 794, 797
(Ct. App. 2002) (citing Beason, 119 Idaho at 105, 803 P.2d at 1011). To the
contrary, any missing portions of the record are presumed to support the actions
of the court below. State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352
(Ct. App. 1992).
With regard to Walck’s claims of ineffective assistance for failing to file a
motion for change of venue and a motion to consolidate with other charges from
5

In regard to Issue 3, Walck’s Appellant’s Brief makes it clear he is arguing that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consolidate charges, stating:
Continuing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim[,] public
defender . . . requested a continuance to the [sic] Judge Burton to a
‘globelization’ [sic] of my numerous charges in other counties, then
changed his mind and told me it would be to [sic] much work
leaving me subjected to further arrests after my plea-agreement.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)
9

other counties, without the underlying criminal court records, Walck cannot
establish that his trial counsel did not file such motions, much less show that,
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), counsel’s performance
was deficient and prejudicial.

Accordingly, the district court’s conclusion that

Walck “has not shown that the attorney’s representation failed to meet objective
standards of competence or that any prejudice resulted from his counsel’s
performance” is presumed to be supported by the underlying criminal record.
See Repici, 122 Idaho at 541, 835 P.2d at 1352.
Similarly, without a transcript of the plea entry hearing or any other
relevant court records and/or transcripts from his criminal case, Walck cannot
show that his trial counsel coerced him into pleading guilty. To the contrary, the
district court referred to the underlying criminal case record when it ruled:
Petitioner claims that he pled guilty to crimes for which he was not
guilty, but the record shows that he pled guilty because he was
guilty. Petitioner claims that he pled guilty due to duress and
compulsion, but the record shows that he pled guilty freely and
voluntarily, affirming to the court that he had not been threatened.
(R., p.40 (emphasis added).) Because the Clerk’s Record and transcripts from
Walck’s underlying criminal case are missing from the appellate record in this
appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the district court.

See

Repici, 122 Idaho at 541, 835 P.2d at 1352.
Because Walck has failed to provide this Court with an adequate record
for appellate review of the summary dismissal of his post-conviction claims, as
challenged in Issues 1, 2, and 3, this Court should affirm the summary dismissal
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of those claims. See Morris, 119 Idaho at 450, 807 P.2d at 1288; Murphy, 129
Idaho at 863, 934 P.2d at 36.
E.

Walck Has Failed To Preserve His Claim That His Trial Counsel Was
Ineffective For Failing To File A Motion To Change Venue
Embedded in Walck’s first issue on appeal – ineffective assistance of

counsel – is the claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion for a change of venue. He states:
Public Defender Christopher Schwartz refused to comply to
reasonable requests “numerous” [sic] to advocate in clients [sic]
Petitioner’s best interest with diligence and prudence forth coming
as an [sic] sworn oblication [sic]. Mr. Schwartz refused to motion
court for a venue change . . . .
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6)
Because Walck is claiming, for the first time in this appeal, that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for a change of venue, he has
waived that issue on appeal.
“Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments
that were presented below.” Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d
375, 379 (2007); see also State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 367, 347 P.3d
1025, 1028 (Ct. App. 2015). “Issues not raised below generally may not be
considered for the first time on appeal.” Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 367, 347 P.3d
at 1028 (citing State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992)).
In post-conviction cases, the petitioner must set forth all of his or her claims in
the post-conviction petition. See I.C. § 19-4903 (petition must “specifically set
forth the grounds upon which the application is based”). Claims not asserted in

11

the pleadings may not be considered on appeal as grounds for finding error in
the summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. Small v. State, 132
Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998).
In his post-conviction petition and supporting affidavit, Walck made no
mention that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for a
change of venue.

(See R., pp.4-12.)

Having failed to raise such an

ineffectiveness claim before the district court, Walck has failed to preserve the
issue for review.
Moreover, to preserve an issue for appellate review, the appellant must
receive an adverse ruling from the trial court on which to base an assignment of
error. See State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 442, 180 P.3d 476, 481 (2008)
(“This Court will not review a trial court’s alleged error on appeal unless the
record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of
error.”) (internal quotations omitted).

Even had Walck presented the

ineffectiveness/venue claim, he certainly did not receive a ruling on that issue.
Because Walck failed to preserve the claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion for a change of venue, he has waived that
issue on appeal and this Court should refuse to consider it.
F.

Even If Walck’s Post-Conviction Claims Are Considered, He Has Failed
To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Summary Dismissal Order And
Order Denying His Motion For Default
The district court summarily dismissed Walck’s post-conviction petition

with prejudice “for the reasons stated in the court’s notice of intent to dismiss[.]”
(R., pp.78-79.)

The court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss also denied Walck’s
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motion for default, which motion was based on Walck’s contention that the state
failed to file a timely Answer to his post-conviction petition. (R., p.37.)
In the event this Court considers the merits of the district court’s summary
dismissal of Walck’s post-conviction claims, and also in regard to the court’s
denial of his motion for default, the state relies upon and incorporates, as if fully
set forth herein, the legal analysis and conclusions in the district court’s Notice of
Intent to Dismiss (R., pp.34-43), attached as Appendix A to this brief. In its
Notice, the district court correctly held that (1) Walck failed to prove the state
failed to plead or defend against the petition because it did, in fact, file a timely
Answer, and (2) Walck failed to present a genuine issue of material fact that
would warrant an evidentiary hearing on any of his post-conviction claims.
Apart from the district court’s well-reasoned analysis, I.C. § 19-4901(b)
serves as an additional ground for summarily dismissing Walck’s claim that his
sentences and convictions are illegal under double jeopardy principles because
he was convicted and sentenced for the same crime in North Dakota.
The remedy available under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act
(“UPCPA”) “is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction.”
I.C. § 19-4901(b). In addition, an “issue which could have been raised on direct
appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction
proceedings” except under very limited circumstances. Id. The plain language of
these statutory provisions indicates that matters that could and should have been
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addressed in the criminal case or on direct appeal are not properly brought under
the UPCPA.
Where, as here, Walck contends he has been subjected to an “[i]llegal
conviction and sentence for crime already convicted of and serving time for
concurrently with the State of North Dakota” (Appellant’s Brief, p.5), he “could
have” raised the issue on direct appeal. I.C. § 19-4901(b). Therefore, Walck has
forfeited the “double jeopardy” issue and it “may not be considered in postconviction proceedings, unless it appears to the court, on the basis of a
substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted
basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt
and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier.”
I.C. § 19-4901(b).

Walck has failed to make a “substantial factual showing”

about the unreliability of his guilt and his due diligence in presenting his claim
earlier.
Because the district court reached the correct conclusion but could also
have dismissed this claim on the additional ground that it is procedurally barred
under I.C. § 19-4901(b), the state requests this Court to affirm on that additional
and/or alternative correct basis. See State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448, 450, 807
P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate review, the lower court’s ruling
must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any theory); State v. Murphy,
129 Idaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1997) (where district court’s ruling
is correct it may be upheld on alternative basis).
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G.

The District Court’s Order Denying Walck’s Motion To Withdraw His Guilty
Pleas Must Be Affirmed Because The Court Lacked Jurisdiction To
Consider It
On April 12, 2016, almost two months after the district court entered its

judgment dismissing his post-conviction petition, Walck filed a “Motion to WithDraw Guilty Plea Declaring Manifest Injustices” (R., pp.108-110) pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c). The motion, filed in the post-conviction case, stated:
COMES NOW, Mitchell Walck, Plaintiff/Defendant . . . in the above
entitled matter as Petitioner has plausible reason [sic] for complete
withdraw [sic]. Manifest Injustice I.C.R. 33C [sic]. An established
abridgement of a constitutional right is deeded a manifest injustice
as a matter of law.
(R., pp.108-110 (emphasis added).)

The district court denied the motion,

succinctly stating:
Concerning the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Declaring
Manifest Injustices, petitioner [sic] has not cited any authority for
such a motion in this case, and the court knows of none.
Accordingly, this motion should be denied.
(R., p.114.)
Walck argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which was filed as a part of his postconviction case under I.C.R. 33(c)’s “manifest injustice” provision.6 The record
demonstrates, however, that the district court was without jurisdiction, after
Walck’s convictions became final, to have even considered Walck’s motion. The
6

Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) states:
Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit
the defendant to withdraw defendant’s plea.
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district court’s order denying Walck’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea must
therefore be affirmed. (See R., pp.111-115.)
In State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 73 P.3d 711 (2003), the Idaho
Supreme Court held:
Rule 33(c) of the Idaho Criminal Rules does not include any
provision extending the jurisdiction of the trial court for the purpose
of hearing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Jakoski was
sentenced on December 12, 1994, and the judgment was entered
on December 22, 1994. He did not appeal the judgment, and it
therefore became final 42 days later. Thereafter, the district court
no longer had jurisdiction to hear a motion to withdraw Jakoski’s
guilty plea [filed almost six years after the judgment was entered].
Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714.
The

Idaho

Supreme

Court’s

holding

in

Jakoski

precludes

any

consideration of Walck’s motion by the district court: “Article V, § 20, grants
district courts the power to hear all types of cases, both at law and in equity. It
does not grant them perpetual jurisdiction to amend or set aside final judgments
in cases that they have heard.” Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714. Here,
as in Jakoski, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear Walck’s Rule
33(c) motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because the motion was filed on April
12, 2016, well after the judgment of conviction entered upon his pleas became
final with the Idaho Supreme Court’s issuance of a remittitur on January 20,
2015. (See R., pp.35,108.) Because Walck filed his Rule 33(c) motion over one
year after his conviction became final, the district court no longer had jurisdiction
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to consider it.7

Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Walck’s motion to

withdraw his guilty pleas must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
summary dismissal of Walck’s post-conviction petition.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2016.
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The state notes that district courts have jurisdiction to consider claims
regarding the validity of guilty pleas raised for the first time in a post-conviction
petition. I.C. § 19-4901; Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho 345, 348-349, 247 P.3d
210, 213-214 (Ct. App. 2010). A motion filed after a judgment dismissing a postconviction petition is not an appropriate vehicle for challenging a guilty plea in a
post-conviction action.
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